This paper proposes the β-WoLF algorithm for multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) that uses an additional "advice" signal to inform agents about mutually beneficial forms of behaviour. β-WoLF is an extension of the WoLF-PHC algorithm that allows agents to assess whether the advice obtained through this additional reward signal is (i) useful for the learning agent itself and (ii) currently being followed by other agents in the system. We report on experimental results obtained with this novel algorithm which indicate that it enables cooperation in scenarios in which the need to defend oneself against exploitation results in poor coordination using existing MARL algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the problem of designing multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms has received much attention (see [1, 3] for overviews) due to its challenging nature. As opposed to the single-agent case [4] (where the environment exhibits a stationary behaviour) MARL adds an element of non-stationarity to the original learning problem since opponents may be adaptive themselves, i.e. their future strategy may be any function of the history of previous system behaviour.
In this paper, we argue that communication about certain properties of agent behaviour can be used to tackle some of the fundamental problems of MARL algorithms, and as a first step toward exploiting this basic idea, we consider stochastic games in which an additional "advice" signal is available to agents that provides feedback about optimal joint actions. We present a novel algorithm called β-WoLF based on WoLF-PHC [1] that enables to autonomously decide whether and to which degree they want to follow that advice based on two simple criteria: (1) advice will only be followed if it yields payoffs that are at least as high as an individually rational strategy (rationality), and (2) advice will only be followed if other agents are also following it (mutuality).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the β-WoLF algorithm, section 3 reports on experimental results and section 4 concludes.
THE β-WoLF ALGORITHM
We use the framework of stochastic games (SGs) [2] and extend it with additional reward signals that represent an information source external to the stochastic game itself. For this, we define n-player stochastic games with advice n, S, A1, . . . , An, T, R1, . . . Rn, W1, . . . , Wn with states S, agent action sets Ai (resulting in a joint action space
Ai), transition model T , individual real-valued reward functions Ri and real-valued individual advice functions Wi : S × A → R for each agent i. We assume that the agents' goal is to learn a stationary (potentially stochastic) policy πi : S × Ai → [0 : 1] that will maximise expected, discounted future payoff in terms of Ri alone, i.e. not taking Wi into account -in other words, obtaining advice does not directly affect the agent's performance. This distinguishes our approach from work on the Collective Intelligence (COIN) framework [5] : we focus on respecting agent autonomy rather than attempting to design individual agent reward functions from a birds-eye point of view.
The way SGs with advice work is as follows: Agents observe state s ∈ S, execute action ai ∈ Ai. Based on the resulting joint action a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A and distribution {T (s, a, s )|s ∈ S} the successor state s is determined. Agent i receives its reward Ri(s, a) and the advice signals Wj(s, a) for all agents j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
1 and the next iteration is initiated.
β-WoLF essentially consists of a number of WoLF-PHC learning "modules" that learn optimal strategies for different sub-problems and a criterion for coordinating how these components are integrated by the agent to yield a single policy. More specifically, a β-WoLF-agent maintains the following data structures:
1. The individual reward learner: A WoLF-PHC learning algorithm used for maximising individual rewards, using a Q-table [6] Q(s, ai), updated using rewards Ri(s, ai) for ai ∈ Ai, and evolving a policy πi(s, ai). A Q-table is maintained for values Q (s, a) where a ∈ A and updated using the 1 We justify below why this is necessary.
The collective reward learner:
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. standard Q-update rule given rewards Ri(s, a) as in Q, to learn how useful joint actions are for the agent considering individual rewards Ri(s, a) as in Q. 3. n individual advice learners: One WoLF-PHC per agent j (including i itself) to simulate j's learning process if it followed the external advice Wi (rather than its actual reward). We denote these Q-tables by Vj(s, aj) for aj ∈ Aj using update equation
and the resulting advice-based strategy by ρj (s, aj ). adjusting β according to the following criterion:
Hereσ−i is the average (posterior) long-term strategy of the remaining agents maintained and updated in the same way asπi in normal WoLF-PHC.
πi(s, ai)Q(s, ai), act according to ρi for k iterations with probability /2 (for some ∈ (0 : 1]) and randomly with probability /2. Else, choose a random action with probability . With probability 1 − behave according to σi.
We discuss each step one by one: First, using normal WoLF-PHC learning, agent i updates tables Q and Q (whose difference is that Q learns estimates for joint, rather than individual actions) and adapts its (individual) strategy πi while updating long-term average strategiesπi/σ−i. Next, a purely advice-based WoLF-PHC learning process is simulated for all agents using tables Vj and individual agent actions aj. The respective strategies ρj will learn to behave optimally "as if" the advice was the actual reward. The actual policy σi for agent i is a convex combination of the reward-based (individual) strategy πi and the advicebased strategy ρi controlled by the advice factor β. To determine whether following advice is better than applying some locally optimal strategy, we compare the expected utility Q (s, a) for agent i under joint action a considering the joint action probability resulting from Q j ρ(s, aj) compared to the expected utility of its individually rational strategy πi that has been evolved disregarding advice completely.
3 To determine whether others are also following the advice, we constantly check whether the distance between the average opponent policy and the advice-based policy |σ−i(s) − ρ−i(s)| is decreasing over time, i.e. if the other agents are "approaching" the behaviour that is optimal according to the advice signal. In the simplest case (which we assume in our experiments below) checking this so-called distance criterion can be done by verifying whether the current value of this distance is smaller than its immediate predecessor. If both conditions apply, β is increased, and otherwise decreased while making sure that its value is bounded by 0 and 1. Thereby, the advice learning rate δβ serves to provide some "inertia" in the process of adapting the degree to which advice is taken into account. Finally, as the criteria for rationality and mutuality of advice taking only verify whether others are following the advice, there is nothing that would ensure that some agent initiates this kind of behaviour if it is beneficial. Therefore, we require that with half the probability that is used for -greedy exploration, the agent follows a purely advice-led strategy for k steps if the advice is beneficial (using the same criterion as above).
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have evaluated the algorithm extensively in a number of two-player games out of which we can only report on results with Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) games here. The calculation of advice was based on the social welfare R1 (s, (a1, a2))+R2(s, (a1, a2) ) of each joint action, such that the "advice giver" acts as a "passive" RL agent and learns action values Qg(s, a) for the global reward of joint action a in state s using ordinary Q-learning. To compute the advice given to the two agents, let
else. This calculates the "relative cooperativeness" of each agent i compared to the most harmful action i might have performed (we use a−i to refer to the joint action of all agents but i). With this, we can can calculate the advice for each agent as Wi(s, a) = qi(s, a)Qg(s, a). We present results regarding joint action probabilities that result from the σ-distributions of the two agents (rather than observed joint action frequencies or average payoffs) to ignore the effects of exploration 4 , and average over 100 repeated simulations 5 ; when referring to joint actions (X, Y ) we assume that the β-WoLF agent is agent 1 (i.e. plays X). For a single run, the results of β-WoLF in a self-play situation are shown in the top part of figure 1: initially, the agents learn the equilibrium strategy (D, D), but the β-value (here shown for one of the two agents only) exhibits occasional "spikes" representing attempts to achieve joint advice following. Eventually the agents succeed in coordinating their attempts and very quickly switch to the Pareto efficient action (C, C) and while occasional deviation from it (due to exploration) implies that its probability is below one, the agents behave cooperatively most of the time. While we cannot give any guarantees for when this switching will occur, in our experiments all 100 simulations converged to an average probability (C, C)-probability of 1 within 5000 rounds.
Beyond self-play, we evaluated the performance of β-WoLF against other types of (fixed and adaptive) opponents. We ran IPD simulations in which the algorithm has to play against an ALL D (always defects), an ALL C (always cooperates), a TIT FOR TAT, and a "malicious" agent (behaves like β-WoLF for 1500 rounds and then switches to ALL D). Convergence to playing the best response D with probability 1 is achieved against ALL C and ALL D within little more than 40 rounds over 100 simulations on the average (not shown for lack of space), we have to be a bit more careful about TIT FOR TAT: Here, the β-WoLF agent cannot represent the opponent's strategy (as it is not merely a probability distribution), but as the plot shows (which depicts the number of games out of 100 that have converged to (C, C) with probability > 0.9) over 90% of all games converge to mutual cooperation. This is an important result which underlines that communicated advice has the capacity to act as a "gold standard" regardless of whether agents can explicitly model their opponents. Results with the malicious agent show that β-WoLF is able to recover from excessive reliance on advice: while being exploited initially (probability of (C, D)), our agent later abandons the advice and switches to best-response behaviour. Unfortunately this may take very long in some cases -as the long average convergence time for 100 simulations indicates. This is due to the fact that (1) Q-tables have converged to (numerically) fairly high values by the time the malicious agent switches to D, (2) the learning rate has decreased by that time and (3) average strategies take very long to adapt to the "misconduct" at this stage.
CONCLUSION
We presented a MARL algorithm for processing advice regarding mutually beneficial behaviour and for to deciding autonomously whether or not to follow. Our experimental evaluation shows that this algorithm generates optimally coordinated behaviour in an example game in which achieving this is a highly non-trivial task for MARL algorithms.
This comes at the price of increased computational complexity. Also, advice-following will only work under certain, fairly strong, assumptions (such as, e.g., that the globably optimal behaviour can be respresented as a convex combina- tion of individually rational strategies and the strategy suggested by the advice signal). However, this shortcoming is alleviated by the fact that if all else fails, β-WoLF agents will resort to using their individual reward WoLF-PHC learning module and learn a simple best-response strategy -our additional machinery does not jeopardise the performance guarantees of a communication-free MARL.
In the future, we would like to establish formal properties of the algorithm (especially in terms of performance guarantees), and to exploit more complex forms of (potentially unreliable) communication for the development of advanced MARL algorithms.
